
March 1, 1975

STRATEGIC FORCES

	I. Let	me begin w	ith a brief d	liscussion	of Soviet	
era Ma	str	ategic weap	ons programs.	•	8	
, i	A.	This map sl	nows the loca	tions wher	e the USSR's	25X
		ICBMs are	deployed, wit	h the type	s of systems	
		indicated.	We believe	that	ІСВМ	
		launchers a	ere currently	operation	al. Since	
		the signing	of the SALT	agreement	s, the Sovie	ts 25
		have not in	ncreased the	number of	ICBM launcher	rs. 25
5X1		1. Of the	deployed lau	nchers,	are i	for
		the SS-	·9.	•	•	
				The large	est number of	-25
X1		silos,	however, are	for the s	maller SS-11	
		and SS-	·13 systems,	•	<u> </u>	
AGE	2.	yield	· ·			
	ICBM Tes	t Programs				25
	iı.			0	· " · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
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


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- VIII. In addition to ICBMs, the Soviets also have a sizeable force of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles. These missiles, the SS-4 and the SS-5, are older systems deployed in the early to mid-1960s.
 - A. The SS-4, an MRBM, has a range of about 1,000 nautical miles and the SS-5, an IRBM, has a range of about 2,200 nautical miles. They are deployed at soft launch sites and in launch silos

- 6 -

1				
	1.	There are currently	aunchers	25X1
		for these missiles operat	cional in the	-
		western USSR, for use pri	marily against	
	•	targets in western Europe	2.	
	2.	At one time, the Soviets	had a force of	
		MRBM and IRBM	launchers located	•
25X1		along the periphery of the	e USSR. In late	
		1967, however, they began	deactivating	25X1
		some of the launch sites.		
	<u> </u>			25X1
-				•
				:
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Approved For Release	2006/10/17	CIA-RDP80R0173	1R002400210034-0
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1 March 1975

ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES


I.	In recent years, there have been fewer developments
	in Soviet strategic defenses than in offensive mis-
	siles or submarines.

A.	The Russians still have a
•	launchers at four complexes around Moscow,
	and there is no evidence of any effort to
	deploy ABMs elsewhere.

25X1

25X1

B. To provide early warning of approaching missiles, the Soviets have large radars which we call Hen Houses operating at five sites on the periphery



1 March 1975

STRATEGIC BOMBERS

	I.	There has been no appreciable change in the capabilities
		of Soviet Long Range Strategic Aviation over the past
1		few years. A. The Soviets have a force of heavy bombers 25%
	[tankers and reconnaissance aircraft whose primary
		mission is intercontinental operations. They also have medium bombers for use mainly against 25X1
**	4.	Europe and Asia.
		1. 25X1
,		1. The Backfire is a swing-wing medium bomber with
	٠.	speed in excess of Mach 2 and a range of up to 3,100 nautical miles under ideal flight condi-
		tions. It is best suited for operations against
		targets in Europe and Asia.

4. As the Backfire is phased into the force,
the number of medium bombers in Soviet Long
Range Aviation should begin to decline.
The Backfire costs substantially more than
older medium bombers, and so the Soviets
probably will not replace them on a
one-for-one basis.

1 March 1975

THE SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON

- I. I would like to spend a few minutes talking about Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean area.
 - A. The most visible military presence there is the Mediterranean Squadron, the largest group of Soviet naval ships deployed away from home waters.
 - 1. The primary mission of the Squadron is to provide a strategic defense of the Soviet Union by countering the US Sixth Fleet carrier task forces. The Soviets also have a continuing interest in improving their capabilities against ballistic missile firing submarines.
 - To accomplish these goals the Soviets maintain an average—including surface combatants, submarines, and auxiliaries—

25X1

- II. Soviet capabilities to attack Western surface forces in the Mediterranean continue to improve but the Soviet warships do not yet overpower the US Sixth Fleet.
 - A. The Soviet forces include torpedo attack submarines, cruise missile armed submarines and modern surface combatants.

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expected to be fully operational in late 1976--will probably operate primarily in the Mediterranean. This

25X1

--will probably


carry V/STOL aircraft and ASW heli-

)EV4

copters.

(1) These drawings show the size of the Soviet carrier in relation to US carriers.

ARB III



March 1, 1975

CHINESE STRATEGIC WEAPONS

I.	A m	ajor	change in the Sino-Soviet military equation
	is	Chin	a's growing nuclear capability. Today China
	can	del:	iver nuclear weapons on targets around its
	per	iphe	ry by both missile and bomber.
	A.		25X
			These missiles are of two types:
		1.	The 600 mileor medium rangemissile we
			call the CSS-1. As you can see from this
	:		map, this system can reach targets in the
			Soviet Far East, Mongolia, Korea, Japan,
			Taiwan, and Southeast Asia
			25x
			. /
		2.	The 1,500 nautical milesor intermediate range
			missile we call the CSS-2.
			this system could strike targets , 25%
		'	in most of the eastern USSR. much of India.

and Southeast Asia as far south as Singapore.

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		25X1
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3.	The map also shows the coverage of China's	
	TU-16 bomber force which I will discuss a	
	bit later.	25X1
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F. In addition to their nuclear missile force, the	
Chinese have TU-16 medium bombers, which	25
can carry a bomb to a radius of	2.5
about 1,650 nautical miles.	حديث شاعد
	25

about 50 airfields throughout China are suitable for use by TU-16s and the bombers could be widely dispersed if Peking feared that an attack was imminent.

3.	The Chinese also	o have L-28 jet
	light bombers.	
	Wil	
	2.	Chinese may plan to give a
	nuclear role to	some of these aircraftwhich
	have an operati	onal radius of about 550
	nautical miles.	

25X1

25X1



II. The Soviet buildup along the Chinese border has slowed considerably since the late Sixties, and the Soviets appear to have nearly reached their force goals for the area.

- A. There are about 38 active divisions in the immediate border area, compared with 13 in 1964.
 - 1. The five divisions from the Siberian


 Military District that could be used as

 immediate reinforcements bring the total

 to about 43.
- B. For air support, they could call on some 1,200 tactical combat aircraft stationed in the border area.

C. The ground and tactical air forces in the border area now number about 400,000 men.

25X



D. Since the Soviet buildup on the Chinese border reached a peak in the late Sixties the Russians have concentrated on improving and fleshing out the basic force,

25X1

25X1

E. As the rate at which the Soviets have added new divisions has slowed, they have increasingly turned their strength to developing support units at the army and front level.

25X1

F. The Soviet forces now in place could defend against any force the Chinese would be likely to send against the USSR in the next several

years.

- As they now stand, however, they would need substantial reinforcement before engaging in protracted offensive operations deep into China.
- III. On the Chinese side, Peking has only gradually expanded the forces in its four northern military regions since the rapid build-up following the border clashes in 1969.
 - A. The force in these four northern military regions numbers about 1.6 million combat and support troops, over 45 percent of China's 3.5 million troops.
 - 1. Most of the Chinese troops are deployed well back from the border. This contrasts with the Soviets, whose forward deployment reflects a clear military superiority and a commitment to the vital Trans-Siberian Railway supply line which parallels the China border.
 - 2. In contrast to the heavily mechanized Soviet forces with their modern equipment, the Chinese are deficient in armor and artillery, and their weaponry is of 1950s design. In tanks alone, the Chinese have fewer than

4,000 in the border regions against more than 10,000 on the Soviet side.

- B. The Chinese have made use of favorable terrain features to build a series of fortified areas along the major approaches from the Soviet and Mongolian borders.
 - This suggests that the Chinese intend to conduct a determined defense in these areas.
- c. The Chinese also have aircraft in the northern military regions, about 40% of their total force. Most of the aircraft have an air defense role and are deployed in eastern China to protect important population and industrial centers.
- D. At present, Chinese troops outnumber the Soviets in the border area by more than three to one.

 Nonetheless, the Soviets would have a substantial advantage in any operations other than a deep penetration of China because of their superiority in air power and in ground force weapons.

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